

Phil. 106: Kant

Take Home Exam 1

Instructions

Answer any *one* of the following questions in 2–3 pages (double spaced). Your answer is due, as an attachment, via the “Assignments” tool on eCommons, by midnight Wednesday, Rocktober 23rd. Please submit in MSWord format (.doc or .docx are both fine) or in a format easily convertible to MSWord (e.g. plain text or RTF). The eCommons site is set to accept late submissions, though late papers (without an approved extension) may not receive full credit. It is *not* set to allow resubmissions: once you press the “submit” button, it will not let you change your response. If, however, you mistakenly submit something and want to change it, please contact me and I will make an exception.

The questions are keyed to different sections of the reading, with the idea that each question is raised most centrally in a certain section. However, you can and should use material from anywhere in the text where it’s relevant to the answer.

Because this is an exam rather than a paper, I will give priority to accuracy over originality in grading. However, all the questions do require some thought; they can’t simply be read out of the texts. Moreover, in many (if not all) cases the “correct” answer is unavoidably a matter of interpretation: in such cases it would be safest to reproduce what I said in class, but it will also be acceptable if you’re clearly following some other reasonable interpretation. And, of course, as usual, your answer must be “original” in the sense that it is your own work. (If you use any outside source — which I *don’t* recommend — you must cite it.)

Since we read the B edition only, please base your answer on the B edition text (where there are differences). You can cite it by the B-edition page number (e.g., “B112”).

For answers to some common questions about my assignments, please see this FAQ.

Questions

1. (Preface) Consider the following two descriptions of “metaphysics”: (a) metaphysics concerns our pure a priori knowledge of the world of experience — that is, what we know *about* the objects of experience, but not *based on* experience; (b) metaphysics concerns causes and principles of the world of experience which are themselves outside the realm of experience. Why does

it seem that the outcome of this book will be positive with respect to (a), telling us what we can hope to know about metaphysics in that sense and how we can expect to know it, but completely negative with respect to (b), telling us simply that we have no hope of such knowledge? Why, according to Kant, do we nevertheless also obtain an important positive outcome from the discussion of (b), as well?

2. (Introduction) Using Kant's example, "All bodies are extended," explain in two ways what it means to say that it is an *analytic judgment*: first way, by thinking of judgments, in general, as the application of predicates to subjects (so that the form of every judgment is something like "S is P"); second way, by thinking of judgments in general as knowledge on a condition (so that the form of every judgment is something like "Rule R holds on condition C."). Explain, in the same two ways, why "All bodies are heavy," according to Kant, is synthetic. How is a "third thing" involved in making such a judgment, and what is the third thing in this case? Why, then, is it surprising that some synthetic judgments (according to Kant) are also a priori?
3. (Aesthetic) Explain Kant's distinction between (human) "intuitions" and "concepts" (just in general: you needn't discuss in detail the special case of *pure* intuition). Address the fact that intuitions are singular, immediate, passive representations and concepts general, mediate, active ones — how are those characteristics related to one another? Why, according to Kant, must knowledge of an empirical object involve both of these two types of representation? What role is played by each? Within the intuition, what is the role, specifically, of *sensation*? What is it that "corresponds" to sensation?
4. (Metaphysical Deduction) Using a simple empirical example (e.g., the concept *cinnabar*, as discussed in class) explain how it must represent its object if it is to be suitable as a subject for: (a) a universal categorical judgment (e.g. "All cinnabar is red"); (b) a particular categorical judgment (e.g. "Some cinnabar is shiny"); (c) a singular categorical judgment (e.g. "This cinnabar weighs 5 grams"). Assuming every empirical concept must have these characteristics, why does this show that the three moments of quantity (unity, plurality, and totality) are *categories*?