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1.
- (Preface) Consider the following two descriptions of “metaphysics”:
(a) metaphysics concerns our pure a priori knowledge about the world
of experience — that is, it concerns what we know about the objects of
experience, but not based on experience; (b) metaphysics concerns causes and
principles of the world of experience which are themselves outside the realm
of experience. Why does it seem that the outcome of this book will be positive
with respect to (a), telling us what we can hope to know about metaphysics
in that sense and how we can expect to know it, but completely negative with
respect to (b), telling us simply that we have no hope of such knowledge?
Why, according to Kant, do we nevertheless also obtain an important positive
outcome from the discussion of (b), as well?
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2.
- (Introduction) Using Kant’s example, “All bodies are extended,” explain
in two ways what it means to say that it is an analytic judgment: first way, by
thinking of judgments, in general, as the application of predicates to subjects
(so that the form of every judgment is something like “S is P”); second way,
by thinking of judgments in general as knowledge on a condition (so that the
form of every judgment is something like “Rule R holds on condition C.”).
Explain, in the same two ways, why “All bodies are heavy,” according to
Kant, is synthetic. Why, in make such a judgment, does the understanding
require support from some other thing (“= X”), other than the concepts of
the subject and the predicate? What provides the external support in the
case of an empirical judgment such as “All bodies are heavy”? Why, then,
is it surprising that some synthetic judgments (according to Kant) are also
a priori?
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3.
- (Aesthetic) Explain Kant’s distinction between (human) “intuitions” and
“concepts” (just in general: you needn’t discuss in detail the special case
of pure intuition). Address the fact that intuitions are singular, immediate,
passive representations and concepts general, mediate, active ones — how
are those characteristics related to one another? Why, according to Kant,
must knowledge of an empirical object involve both of these two types
of representation (intuitions and concepts)? What role is played by each?
Within the intuition, what is the role, specifically, of sensation? What is it
that “corresponds” to sensation?
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4.
- (Metaphysical Deduction) Using a simple empirical example (e.g., the
concept cinnabar, as discussed in class) explain how that concept must
represent its object if it is to be suitable as a subject for: (a) a universal
categorical judgment (e.g. “All cinnabar is red”); (b) a particular categorical
judgment (e.g. “Some cinnabar is shiny”); (c) a singular categorical
judgment (e.g. “This cinnabar weights 5 grams”). Assuming every empirical
concept must have these characteristics, why does this show that the three
moments of quantity (unity, plurality, and totality) are categories?