-
1.
- (Transcendental Deduction, part I) A deduction, according to Kant,
establishes the legitimacy or “objective validity” of a concept — that is, it
explains how we know that the manifold of appearances can be synthesized
(by the imagination) in such a way as to be unified by that concept. Explain
(1) why, according to Kant, we don’t normally need a deduction of empirical
concepts; (2) why, if we do want a deduction of an empirical concept, it will
be what Kant calls an “empirical deduction” — that is, roughly, an account
of how we acquired the concept in the first place; and (3) why an alleged
empirical deduction of a pure concept (for example, of one of the categories)
would not be a deduction at all.
-
2.
- (Transcendental Deduction, part II) Assume that every representation
of mine can at least potentially be accompanied by the representation “I
think”: that is, that every representation involves a rule which is applied to
a certain case, but which could equally apply to other cases. Explain why
Kant would call this “the analytic unity of apperception” (remembering that
“apperception” means self-consciousness). Why does this presuppose that I
can represent (determine, refer to) some single object via the representation
“I”? Why would Kant call that “the synthetic unity of apperception”?
-
3.
- (Schematism) Explain why an empirical concept, such as the concept dog,
does not apply directly to sense impressions: why the sense impressions I
receive from any particular dog are never a pure and complete case of the rule
that makes up the concept. What role does the faculty of imagination play
in allowing such a concept to be applied? (In what way does the imagination
“produce” an image for unification by the understanding?) How does this
involve a “schema”? Give another example which shows the role of the
imagination and its schemata in the case of mathematical concepts. Why is
there a special problem with there being schemata for pure concepts of the
understanding, such as the categories?
-
4.
- (System of Principles) The Highest Principle of All Synthetic Judgments
is, roughly, that the appearances must be such that they can all be thought
together as mine (in the synthetic unity of apperception). What does this
have to with the categories, and with the schemata of the categories? How
does it rule out certain synthetic judgments — for example, “Some event has
no cause” — as, not self-contradictory, but empty? Why do such purported
synthetic judgments undermine themselves, even though their predicate (e.g.
“non-caused”) does not contradict their subject (e.g. “event”)?
-
5.
- (Phenomena and Noumena) The Transcendental Analytic has shown that
all the objects of our knowledge are phenomena: that is, they are objects (of a
cognitive faculty) only insofar as they appear (are given in sensible intuition).
Kant (as I understand him) then entertains an objection along these lines:
doesn’t this mean that we do, after all, know something about noumena: that
is, about things which are objects of our understanding directly, without the
mediation of a sensible intuition? Explain why this objection might arise:
that is, why the conclusion of the Transcendental Analytic might seem to
have that implication. Explain further why, if this were correct, it would
imply that the categories apply, not only to the objects of experience, but to
objects in general.
-
6.
- (Amphiboly) Consider the concepts of identity and difference. Explain
why we must be able to apply them to objects if we are to think of those
objects under concepts (for example, to think of an object as cinnabar, or as
some cinnabar, or as this cinnabar). How, according to Kant, can we actually
apply these concepts (of identity and difference) to objects: that is, what
makes two objects different? (Hint: how is space involved?) Why would that
not work, according to Kant, if the objects of our knowledge were noumena?