(Transcendental Deduction, part I) A deduction, according to Kant,
establishes the legitimacy or “objective validity” of a concept — that is, it
explains how we know that the manifold of appearances can be synthesized
(by the imagination) in such a way as to be unified by that concept. Explain
(1) why, according to Kant, we don’t normally need a deduction of empirical
concepts; (2) why, if we do want a deduction of an empirical concept, it will
be what Kant calls an “empirical deduction” — that is, roughly, an account
of how we acquired the concept in the first place; and (3) why an alleged
empirical deduction of a pure concept (for example, of one of the categories)
would not be a deduction at all.
2.
(Transcendental Deduction, part II) Assume that every representation
of mine can at least potentially be accompanied by the representation “I
think”: that is, that every representation involves a rule which is applied to
a certain case, but which could equally apply to other cases. Explain why
Kant would call this “the analytic unity of apperception” (remembering that
“apperception” means self-consciousness). Why does this presuppose that I
can represent (determine, refer to) some single object via the representation
“I”? Why would Kant call that “the synthetic unity of apperception”?
3.
(Schematism) Explain why an empirical concept, such as the concept dog,
does not apply directly to sense impressions — in particular, does not apply
directly to images of dogs. What role does the faculty of imagination play in
allowing such a concept to be applied? (In what way does the imagination
“produce” an image?) How does this involve a “schema”? Give another
example which shows the role of the imagination and its schemata in the case
of mathematical concepts. Why is there a special problem with there being
schemata for pure concepts of the understanding, such as the categories?
4.
(System of Principles) The Highest Principle of All Synthetic Judgments
is, roughly, that the appearances must be such that they can all be thought
together as mine (in the unity of apperception). What does this have to with
the categories, and with the schemata of the categories? How does it rule out
certain synthetic judgments as, not self-contradictory, but empty? Why do
such purported synthetic judgments undermine themselves, even though the
predicate (more generally: the knowledge or rule) in them does not contradict
the subject (more generally: the condition on which they apply the rule).
5.
(Phenomena and Noumena) The Transcendental Analytic has shown that
all the objects of our knowledge are phenomena: that is, they are objects (of a
cognitive faculty) only insofar as they appear (are given in sensible intuition).
Kant (as I understand him) then entertains an objection along these lines:
doesn’t this mean that we do, after all, know something about noumena: that
is, about things which are objects of our understanding directly, without the
mediation of a sensible intuition? Explain why this objection might arise:
that is, why the conclusion of the Transcendental Analytic might seem to
have that implication. Explain further why, if this were correct, it would
imply that the categories apply, not only to the objects of experience, but to
objects in general.
6.
(Amphiboly) Consider the concepts of identity and difference. Explain
why we must be able to apply them to objects if we are to think of those
objects under concepts (for example, to think of an object as cinnabar, or as
some cinnabar, or as this cinnabar). How, according to Kant, can we actually
apply these concepts (of identity and difference) to objects: that is, what
makes two objects different? (Hint: how is space involved?) Why would that
not work, according to Kant, if the objects of our knowledge were noumena?