Suggested topics

What, according to the authors we’ve read, is the relationship between (some or all of): (1) science; (2) philosophy of science; (3) philosophy (in general); and (4) history of science? Are some just subﬁelds of the others? What, if at all, distinguishes one from the other(s)? Subject matter? Methodology? Something else? Which needs or can use the results of which other(s) to do their work? Which is most rational, most authoritative, most free? Which do our authors take themselves to be doing and why?

A related issue (but not exactly the same): from what, according to our authors, is science to be “demarcated”? To what ﬁeld or discipline does it belong to make this demarcation, and/or from what point of view do we make it, and/or who is authorized or has the requisite knowledge or ability to make it? How can we tell if the demarcation has been made correctly or not, and/or in what terms can we criticize a suspect or incorrect demarcation? Why, if at all, is such demarcation important? (E.g., what characteristics of science make it important that we not confuse it with something else?) Would something go wrong if we made the demarcation incorrectly or not at all, or is this just a matter of intellectual interest?

What, according to our authors, is the proper relationship between (what Quine calls) the “conceptual side” and the “doctrinal side” (of science, epistemology, philosophy or history of science, and/or whatever seems relevant)? Which is prior, and/or more important, and/or more relevant to “demarcation” (or to some other problem), and/or more fruitful to talk about? Has this proper relationship mostly been maintained (by scientists and/or philosophers), or has it, according to our authors, sometimes or often been gotten wrong, either in theory or in practice? What can we learn from the history of philosophy, especially from Hume and/or Kant, about this relationship? How and why do our authors disagree in their interpretation of that history?

Discuss the meaning of and/or relationship between some of the following things, according to authors we’ve read: (scientiﬁc) theory, observation(s), common or everyday knowledge, experience, sense data. How (if at all) do they deﬁne them? Which do they consider most certain/reliable, or more justiﬁed, or otherwise better, and why? Do they think that some of these things are not well deﬁned, or not relevant to science, or don’t exist at all? Which of them depend on or change along with our scientiﬁc theories, practices, standards, methodological decisions, and/or ways of “seeing”? How and on what grounds do our authors disagree with each other about these issues? (How, if at all, is it possible to disagree about the deﬁnitions? Can’t everyone deﬁne the terms as he or she likes? What would our various authors say about that?)

A more general suggestion, which to some extent overlaps with some of the above: pick a diﬀerence or debate between two authors and explain what the real disagreement is (as opposed to what one might have thought it was). You can try to decide who “wins,” if you want, but I don’t particularly recommend that.

What was really important to Popper, and what wasn’t? How does this explain the adjustments in his project as time went on, and/or his response to (one or more of) his critics? To write on this you should probably look at least at Popper’s responses to his critics and/or to Kuhn in The Philosophy of Karl Popper, ed. Schilpp (on reserve at McHenry). (You could also try doing the same thing with Kuhn—the “Postscript” to SSR might be useful here, but I’ll try to suggest some more stuﬀ if people are interested.)

Carnap was an Old Left democratic socialist, Neurath was a Marxist, Quine was a right wing conservative (though, I’ve been told, perhaps not so extreme earlier on), Putnam was (in the period when he wrote “What Theories Are Not” and “The ‘Corroboration’ of Theories”) a New Left activist, and Popper was a anti-Marxist liberal democrat (probably more information than you want on that is available in his books, The Poverty of Historicism and The Open Society and Its Enemies). (I unfortunately don’t know much about Goodman, Lakatos or Kuhn’s politics.) Discuss the relationship between the political views of these authors (i.e., one or more of them) and their views in philosophy of science. (I hinted at some things about this in class, but there’s a lot more to be said.) (Note: to do this well you need to understand and deal carefully with the philosophy of science aspect, not just take oﬀ on the politics.)