-
1.
- (Preliminary Conception) Assume that §§20–23 have the following
structure: (α = §20) thinking as subjective; (β, γ = §§21–2) thinking-over
(Nachdenken); ([δ] = §23) free thinking. Explain thinking-over as a
shining-within-itself of subjective thinking (i.e., explain why it is a second
moment), why it is thinking of an object (Objekt), and why this means
getting at the essence of that object, or what really matters about it (the
Sache). Finally, considering free thinking as the third moment (as moment of
being-for-self), explain why the three moments taken together characterize
thinking in the way appropriate to “objective idealism” (as hinted at also in
§24).
-
2.
- (Quality) Consider the following (partial) summary of Descartes’s Second
and Third Meditations: (1) the Second Meditation shows that I, a thinking
thing, am (have being); (2) the Third Meditation discusses the heterogeneous
objective being of my ideas (that they are heterogeneous to each other
because they are ideas of qualitatively different “something” ’s) and (3)
compares it with to their homogeneous formal being (that they are
homogeneous, all of the same kind, insofar as they are all just my ideas).
How might (1), (2) and (3) be correlated with the moments of quality:
being, being-there (Dasein), and being-for-self? (Recall what Hegel says
about being-for-self in the Addition to §96: “The most familiar form of
being-for-itself is the ‘I.’ We known ourselves as beings who are there [als
daseiende], first of all distinct from all other such beings, and as related to
them. But secondly, we also know that this expanse of being-there is, so to
speak, focused onto the simple form of being-for-self.”) Use the correlation to
explain, from Hegel’s point of view, why the immediate form of consciousness
is time: that is, why consciousness is, immediately, the unified consciousness
of a succession of determinate contents, one after the other.
-
3.
- (Quantity) Consider a correlation between the following moments of quality
and of quantity:
|
|
quality | quantity |
|
|
becoming (third moment of being, §88) | continuous quantity |
true infinite (third moment of being-there, §95) | discrete quantity |
attraction (third moment of being-for-self, §98) | unity |
|
|
|
The three moments on the right are the moments of “pure quantity” (all
described in §100, p. 160).
We might expect a correlation something like this given that pure quantity is the
“frozen” unity of being and being-there, i.e. the collapse into a new immediacy of
the “fluid” unity which constitutes being-for-self. In other words: the whole
movement of the Quality section repeats itself, in “frozen” form, within pure
quantity.
Explain in detail how, in each case, the quantitative moment is a quantitative
version of the qualitative one. For example: explain how continuous quantity
(that is, quantity regarded as both determinate and indeterminate, as
having no stable stopping places within itself) is becoming regarded as
characterizing a dimension in which determination can vary indifferently to the
being of which it is a determination, and similarly for the other two pairs.
(Hints: in the case of discrete quantity, remember that we are not talking
about a particular discrete quantity, a number, but rather about, so to
speak, discrete quantitativeness, what is common to all discrete quantities;
with respect to unity, remember that attraction is the unity of one and
many.)
-
4.
- (Measure) In the second question on the first writing assignment, I asked about
the sense in which Hegel agrees with Protagoras that “the human being is the
measure of all things” (even though, of course, Hegel doesn’t think this is the
whole truth). Now consider interpreting this statement as follows: there
are no qualitative differences between things as they really are (what
really exists is just qualitiless atoms); every quality (for example: sensible
qualities such as white and hot) is only the result of the way someone
perceives the atoms hitting her sense organs. (This, or something like
this, is the interpretation of Protagoras which Socrates advances in the
Theaetetus.)
Explain, first, why Hegel might say that measure is the exact right determination
to use in expressing this thought (which, again, is, in a sense, a true thought).
Hints: (a) think of measure as quantity-for-quality, in the following way: a whole
manifold of indifferent quantitative variation, within a certain determinate range,
is unified by its correspondence to one determinate quality (and see the end of the
Addition to §106, p. 169: in quantitative determinations about the world, we are
really concerned “to discover the quantities that underly determinate qualities”);
(b) try to understand why Hegel (in the Remark to §99) connects quantity
with materialism (which you can understand to mean: the view that
everything that exists is just more and more of the same basic stuff); (c) as
suggested in the original writing assignment, think of measure as a form of
being-for-self, hence of finite consciousness as an application of measure (see
again the Addition to §96: in consciousness, the “expanse of being-there
[Dasein]” is “focused onto the simple form of being-for-self,” that is: all the
infinite different somethings are what they are only for the one simple
self).
Second, explain roughly how the judgment of the concept — a finite application of
which, fully developed, would be “This house (being constituted in such-and-such
a way) is good (i.e., a good house)” (§179; cf. the same example of a house, §99R,
p. 158: a house remains a house if you make it bigger or smaller, but,
this will be moment of measure: only within certain limits) — is a form
of measure, and use that correlation to show why, according to Hegel,
Protagoras’ position about qualities entails, or goes along with, moral
relativism.
-
5.
- (Essence as Ground of Existence) The moment of ground (§§121–2) has no
clear internal structure in the Encyclopedia (and the 1812 Science of Logic is too
different in these sections to provide much guidance). However, one way we could try
to fill in that structure would be by making a parallel with other sections. Here is
one suggestion, based on drawing a parallel between Essence as the Ground of
Existence, on the one hand, and the whole Doctrine of the Concept, on the other:
|
|
Essence as Ground | Doctrine of |
of Existence | the Concept |
|
|
identity | concept |
distinction | judgment |
ground | syllogism |
|
|
|
Explain how each item in the second column differs from the corresponding item
in the first column by the presence of a mediating particularity (which shows up in
the judgment as the copula and in the syllogism as the middle term; in the
concept as such, the mediating particularity is just particularity). (Hint:
remember that the moment of identity, as a moment of essence, contains an
internal “shining” — it is the essential identity of what is, inessentially, distinct;
similarly, distinction is the essential distinctness of what is, inessentially,
identical; similarly, ground is the essential unity of identity and distinction which
shows the distinction between identity and distinction to be inessential: the
consequences contain all the same content as the ground. In the sphere of the
concept, mediation will replace “shining.”) Then, use the parallel to sketch
very roughly what might correspond to the moments of the syllogism
(the qualitative syllogism, S–P–U; the syllogism of reflection, U–S–P;
and the syllogism of necessity, P–U–S) as moments of ground. (Hint:
think of universality as parallel to identity, particularity as parallel to
distinction, and singularity as parallel to the unity of the two. Then in
each case think of the essential ground as the first term of the syllogism,
of the inessential qua consequence standing out from the ground as the
third term, as ask what it means that the middle, mediating term of each
syllogism is missing, replaced by “shining,” in the parallel moment of
ground.)
-
6.
- (Appearance) In §135, discussing the essential relationship (Verhältnis) of
whole and part, Hegel says that “the content is the whole and consists of [besteht
aus] its opposite [Gegenteil], i.e., of the parts [Teile] (of the form)” (§135). Based
on this (and perhaps other things he says there), explain in what sense Hegel can
say the following about his system. First, we can see the system as a whole which
consists of parts — that is, this way of seeing the system is not simply wrong.
Second, however, this way of seeing the system is not fully adequate, hence not
fully true: in fact, because division into parts (Teile) yields the mere form of
the system, the result in a way is the precise opposite (Gegenteil) of a
true understanding of its content (Inhalt). Explain further why, if we
stop with this way of looking at the system (as a whole consisting of
parts), what we will have the mere appearance of a system, and why,
as a result, we will not be able to understand how one can call a halt
(Halt) to the further addition of new parts (see the Addition to §131,
p. 200: “appearance is still this inwardly broken [in sich Gebrochene]
[moment] that does not have any stability [Halt] of its own” — but you
must explain that, and hopefully in a way which connects it to Inhalt
and Verhältnis). Finally, consider the following correlation: whole/parts
(§135)–living thing within itself (§218); force/expression (§§136–7)–living thing
and its environment (eating) (§219); inner/outer (§§138–41)–living thing
and its genus (reproduction and death) (§§220–21). Explain why this
is appropriate and argue that the original way of seeing the system (as
whole and parts) is inadequate precisely because it regards the system as
inanimate.
-
7.
- (Actuality) Consider the following two accounts of the relationship between
God, the world as possibility, and the world as actuality. (1) “Before” God created
the world, it had no real possibility at all: it was “merely,” formally possible, and,
in creating the world, God added nothing at all to this mere possibility, other
than the relationship to his actualizing will, nor was there anything in the content
of the world which made that will necessary: the world was created by grace, and
is purely contingent. (This is Descartes’s view, more or less.) (2) The
possibility of the world simply is the divine essence; God’s “creation” of the
world doesn’t take him out of himself, or even express something about
him which was merely implicit: God and the world are the same thing,
considered as substance or cause (potentiality as might, power) and as modes
or as effect (actuality as passive) — creation is the God’s self-activity
or self-causation. (This is Spinoza’s view, as Hegel points out: God as
active substance = natura naturans, as passive modes = natura naturata;
God is the self-caused, the causa sui.) Taking the two sides of actuality
(semblance and essence) in their primary application, as determinations of the
absolute, explain in what sense Hegel can say that both of these seemingly
mutually inconsistent alternatives is correct, but both are still inadequate in
that they regard the world as mere actuality, not as independent object
(Objekt), or (which is to say the same thing) in that they leave out the
moment of divine purpose (which is supplied only in Leibniz’s view: see the
Remark to §194, as well as the discussion of Leibniz in the Addition to §121,
pp. 190–91). (Note: if you are not familiar with Descartes, Spinoza, and Leibniz,
you should be able to answer this without referring to them; I mention
them because, if you are familiar with them, it may help to keep them in
mind.)
-
8.
- (Subjective Concept) One determination Hegel uses to explain the nature of
the speculative or concrete universal is continuity:
Within being the abstract form of the progression is an other and
passing-over into an other; within essence [it is] shining within what
is opposed; in the Concept it is the distinctiveness of the singular
from the universality which, as such, continues itself into what is
distinct from it, and is as identity with the latter. (§240, p. 306;
translation slightly altered)
Explain, first, how the moments of pure quantity — continuity, discreteness, and
unity (§§99–100) — are relevant here. In what way is the distinctness of the
singular from the universal like the distinctness of unity from continuity? (Hint:
continuity makes sense as the first moment of Quantity because it is completely
indifferent to the (qualitative) determinations of the quantified “something”:
insofar as something is continuously quantified, it is everywhere the same. But the
quantitatively unified something has quantitative determinations to which the
determination of unity is indifferent — however much of it is unified, is thereby
the same. Where do the quantitative determinations come from? Where did the
initial continuity go?)
Secondly, explain how this continuity is related to the freedom of the concept,
understanding freedom both (a) as absence of external determination, per
Spinoza’s definition (“That thing [res] is said to be free which exists [existit] from
the necessity of its own nature alone, and is determined to action by itself alone”
[Ethics I, Def. 7].) and (b) as the expression of the will as such, the very nature
of the willing, in a singular act (a conception apparently at odds with
Spinoza’s: see the Scholium to Prop. 49 of Ethics II, “For we have shown
that the will is a universal entity, or the idea whereby we explicate all
particular volitions. So if they believe that this common or universal idea of
volitions is a faculty …”). Bonus question: why might Kierkegaard (or his
pseudonym) suggest that this understanding of freedom is inconsistent with the
concept of an original sin, that is, of a sin committed by an innocent
will?
-
9.
- (Object) [?]
-
10.
- (Idea) [?]