

Phil. 190E: Hegel's Logic

Take Home Final

Instructions

Answer any *two* or *three* of the following questions, 2–3 pages for each answer, for a total of 6–9 pages. Exams are due by Tues., Nov. 6. Please e-mail to me (abestone@ucsc.edu) in PDF or a format easily convertible to PDF (e.g. MSWord, L^AT_EX, plain text, HTML, or RTF).

The questions are keyed to different sections of the text, with the idea that each question is raised most centrally in that place. However, in keeping with the fact that this is a final exam, and also with the self-applying nature of Hegel's system, each question also requires you to consider the section in question in light of other sections.

Because this is an exam rather than a paper, I will give priority to accuracy over originality in grading. However, all the questions do require some thought; they can't simply be read out of the texts. Moreover, in many (if not all) cases the "correct" answer is unavoidably a matter of interpretation: in such cases it would be safest to reproduce what I said in class, but it will also be acceptable if you're clearly following some other reasonable interpretation. And, of course, as usual, your answer must be "original" in the sense that it is your own work. (If you use any outside source—which I *don't* recommend—you must cite it.)

You can cite pages in our text by section number, adding "R" for Remark or "A" for Addition (*Zusatz*) if applicable, and page number.

Questions

1. (Preliminary Conception) Assume that §§20–23 have the following structure: ($\alpha = \text{§20}$) thinking as subjective; ($\beta, \gamma = \text{§§21–2}$) thinking-over (*Nachdenken*); ($[\delta] = \text{§23}$) free thinking. Explain thinking-over as a shining-within-itself of subjective thinking (i.e., explain why it is a second moment), why it is thinking of an object (*Objekt*), and why this means getting at the essence of that object, or what really matters about it (the *Sache*). Finally, considering free thinking as the third moment (about moment of being-for-self), explain why the three moments taken together characterize thinking in the way appropriate to "objective idealism." (as hinted at also in §24).
2. (Quality) Consider the following (partial) summary of Descartes's *Second* and *Third Meditations*: (1) the *Second Meditation* shows that I, a thinking

thing, am (have being); (2) the *Third Meditation* discusses the heterogeneous objective being of my ideas (that they are ideas of qualitatively different “something” ’s) and (3) compares it with to their homogeneous formal being (that they are all my ideas). How might (1), (2) and (3) be correlated with the moments of quality: being, *Dasein*, and being-for-self? (Recall what Hegel says about being-for-self in the *Zusatz* to §96: “The most familiar form of being-for-itself is the ‘I.’ We know ourselves as beings who are there [*als daseiende*], first of all distinct from all other such beings, and as related to them. But secondly, we also know that this expanse of being-there is, so to speak, focused onto the simple form of being-for-self.”) Use the correlation to explain, from Hegel’s point of view, why the immediate form of consciousness is *time*: that is, why consciousness is, immediately, the unified consciousness of a succession of determinate contents, one after the other.

3. (Quantity) Consider the following moments of quality: (1) becoming (third moment of being, §88); (2) the true infinite (third moment of *Dasein*, §95); (3) attraction (third moment of being-for-self, §98). Consider a correlation between those three and the three moments of pure quantity: continuous quantity, discrete quantity, unity (all described in §100, p. 160). (We might expect a correlation something like this given that pure quantity is the “frozen” unity of being and *Dasein*.) Explain in detail how, in each case, the quantitative moment is a quantitative version of the qualitative one. That is: explain how *continuous quantity* is *becoming* regarded as characterizing a dimension in which determination can vary indifferently to the being of which it is a determination, and similarly for the other two pairs (discrete quantity–true infinite, unity–attraction). (Hints: in the case of discrete quantity, remember that we are not talking about a particular discrete quantity, a number, but rather about, so to speak, what is common to all discrete quantities; and remember that attraction is the unity of one and many.)
4. (Measure) In the second short writing assignment, I asked about the sense in which Hegel might agree with Protagoras that “the human being is the measure of all things.” Now consider interpreting this statement as follows: there are no qualitative differences between things as they really are (what really exists is just qualitless atoms); every quality (for example: sensible qualities such as white and hot) is only the result of the way someone perceives the atoms hitting her sense organs. (This, or something like this, is the interpretation of Protagoras which Socrates advances in the *Theaetetus*.) Explain, first, why Hegel might say that *measure* is the exact right

determination to use in expressing this thought. Hints: (a) think of measure as quantity-for-quality, in the sense that indifferent quantitative variation within a certain determinate range is unified by its correspondence to a determinate quality (and see the end of the *Zusatz* to §106, p. 169: in quantitative determinations about the world, we are really concerned “to discover the quantities that underly determinate qualities”); (b) try to understand why Hegel (in the Remark to §99) connects quantity with *materialism*; (c) as suggested in the original writing assignment, think of measure as a form of being-for-self, hence of finite consciousness as an application of measure (see again the *Zusatz* to §96, the “expanse of being-there [*Dasein*]” as “focused onto the simple form of being-for-self”). Second, explain roughly how the judgment of the concept — a finite example, fully developed, would be “This house (being constituted in such-and-such a way) is good (i.e., a good house)” (§179) — is a form of measure, and use that correlation to show why, according to Hegel, Protagoras’ position about qualities entails, or goes along with, moral relativism.

5. (Essence as Ground of Existence) In the Remark to §125 (p. 195), Hegel discusses the difference between “thing” (*Ding*), a determination of essence, and “something” (*Etwas*), a determination of being (introduced in §90). How is the difference between being and essence supposed to explain the difference between something’s being determined by a quality (something as the unity of determination and quality), on the one hand, and the thing’s having a property (thing as the unity of ground and existence), on the other? (Hint: remember the definition of quality as determination identical with being.) Explain, then, based also on the difference between mere transition (passing-over), on the one hand, and “shining,” on the other, why the determination following “something” is “limit” (§92), whereas the determination following “thing” is “appearance.” In what sense is appearance to the thing as limit is to something? Hint: “limit” is the determination in which something, as determinate and therefore finite, is seen to depend on its pure negation: the “spurious” (really, “bad”: *schlechte*) infinite which “is nothing but the negation of the finite” (§94). The world of appearance “proceeds to an infinite mediation of its subsistence by its form” (§132). How is the bad infinite as world of appearance specifically suited to negate the finite as *thing*?
6. (Appearance) In §135, discussing the essential relationship (*Verhältnis*) of whole and part, Hegel says that “the content is the whole and consists of [*besteht aus*] its opposite [*Gegenteil*], i.e., of the parts [*Teile*] (of the form)” (§135). Based on this (and perhaps other things he says there), explain in

what sense Hegel can say the following about his system. First, we *can* see the system as a whole which consists of parts — that is, this way of seeing the system is not simply wrong. Second, however, this way of seeing the system is not fully *adequate*, hence not fully true: in fact, because division into parts (*Teile*) yields the mere *form* of the system, which in a way is the precise opposite (*Gegenteil*) of a true understanding of its *content* (*Inhalt*). Explain further why, if we stop with this way of looking at the system (as a whole consisting of parts), what we will have the mere appearance of a system, and why, as a result, will not be able to understand how one can call a halt (*Halt*) to the further addition of new parts (see the *Zusatz* §131, p. 200: “appearance is still this inwardly broken [*in sich Gebrochene*] [moment] that does not have any stability [*Halt*] of its own” — but you must explain that, and hopefully in a way which connects it to *Inhalt* and *Verhältnis*). Finally, consider the following correlation: whole/parts (§135)–living thing within itself (§218); force/expression (§§136–7)–living thing and its environment (eating) (§219); inner/outer (§§138–41)–living thing and its environment (reproduction and death) (§§220–21). Explain why this is appropriate and argue that the original way of seeing the system (as whole and parts) is inadequate precisely because it regards the system as *inanimate*.

7. (Actuality) Consider the following three accounts of the relationship between God, the world as possibility, and the world as actuality. (1) “Before” God created the world, it had no *real* possibility at all: it was “merely,” formally possible (§143), and, in creating the world, God added nothing at all to this mere possibility, other than the relationship to his actualizing will, nor was there anything in the content of the world which made that will necessary: the world is created by grace, and is purely *contingent* (§144). (This is Descartes’s view, more or less.) (2) The possibility of the world simply is the divine essence; God’s “creation” of the world doesn’t take him out of himself, or even express something about him which was merely implicit: God and the world are the same thing, considered as substance (potentiality as might, power) and as modes or accidents (actuality as passive) — creation is the substance’s self-activity (“activity-of-form,” §150). (This is Spinoza’s view, as Hegel points out in the *Zusatz*: God as active substance = *natura naturans*, as passive modes = *natura naturata*.) (3) God is the *cause* of the world: the two are distinct, but, given the divine nature, the world necessarily follows. Taking the moments of actuality in their primary application as determinations of the absolute, explain in what sense Hegel can say that all three of these seemingly mutually inconsistent alternatives is correct, but that all are still inadequate in that they regard

the world as mere actuality, not as independent object (*Objekt*), or (which is to say the same thing) leave out the moment of divine *purpose* (which is supplied only in Leibniz's view: see the Remark to §194, as well as the discussion of Leibniz in the *Zusatz* to §121, pp. 190–91). (Note: if you are not familiar with Descartes, Spinoza, and Leibniz, you should be able to answer this without referring to them; I mention them because, if you *are* familiar with them, it may help to keep them in mind.)

More questions coming.