Instructions

Note: this assignment, due Feb. 17, is for students in Group I only.

Please respond to the following question in approximately two pages (double spaced). (Needless to say this should be your own original work.)

In §142 (p. 341), Husserl says that “Of essential necessity [prinzipiell] ... to every truly existing object there corresponds the idea of a possible consciousness in which the object itself is seized upon originally and therefore in a perfectly adequate way.” This repeats the doctrine we saw already in the Logical Investigations, that the “truth” of a meaning-state refers to its possible fulfillment (by an intuition “adequate” to its meaning).

As Husserl goes on to point out at the beginning of §143, however (p. 342), this appears to contradict what he said earlier (in §138), namely that — also “of essential necessity” — “something physically real [ein Dingreales] ... appears only ‘inadequately’” (p. 331, p. 286 in the original). How does Husserl resolve this contradiction? What are we intending when regard, for example, a judgment about Dinge (such as: “A blackbird is flying outside the window”) as true?