

Phil. 190R: Hegel's Logic

Take Home Final

Instructions

Answer any *two* or *three* of the following questions, 2–3 pages for each answer, for a total of 6–9 pages. Exams are due by Tues., Mar. 15. Please e-mail to me (abestone@ucsc.edu) in PDF, MSWord, L^AT_EX, plain text, HTML, or RTF.

The questions are keyed to different sections of the text, with the idea that each question is raised most centrally in that place. However, in keeping with the fact that this is a final exam, and also with the self-applying nature of Hegel's system, each question also requires you to consider the section in question in light of other sections.

Because this is an exam rather than a paper, I will give priority to accuracy over originality in grading. However, all the questions do require some thought; they can't simply be read out of the texts. Moreover, in many (if not all) cases the "correct" answer is unavoidably a matter of interpretation: in such cases it would be safest to reproduce what I said in class, but it will also be acceptable if you're clearly following some other reasonable interpretation. And, of course, as usual, your answer must be "original" in the sense that it is your own work. (If you use any outside source—which I *don't* recommend—you must cite it.)

You can cite pages in our text by section number (adding "R" for Remark or "Z" for *Zusatz* if applicable) and page number.

Questions

1. (Preliminary Conception) Assume that §§20–23 have the following structure: ($a = \S 20$) thinking as subjective; ($\beta, \gamma = \S\S 21–2$) thinking-over (*Nachdenken*); ($[\delta] = \S 23$) free thinking. Explain thinking-over as a shining-within-itself of subjective thinking (i.e., explain why it is a second moment), why it is thinking of an object (*Objekt*), and why this means getting at the essence of that object, or what really matters about it (the *Sache*). Finally, considering free thinking as the third moment (about moment of being-for-self), explain why the three moments taken together characterize thinking in the way appropriate to "objective idealism." (as hinted at also in §24).
2. (Quality) Consider the following (partial) summary of Descartes's *Second* and *Third Meditations*: (1) the *Second Meditation* shows that I, a thinking

thing, am (have being); (2) the *Third Meditation* discusses the heterogeneous objective being of my ideas (that they are ideas of qualitatively different “something” ’s) and (3) compares it with to their homogeneous formal being (that they are all my ideas). How might (1), (2) and (3) be correlated with the moments of quality: being, *Dasein*, and being-for-self? Use the correlation to help explain the transition to quantity (see the discussion of the difference between quality and quantity, §85Z, p 136), and also to explain in what sense Hegel agrees with Kant’s doctrine that the category of quantity must be applicable to all objects because succession belongs to the form of inner sense (i.e., to the form of subjective experience).

3. (Quantity) Consider the following moments of quality: (1) becoming (third moment of being, §88); (2) the true infinite (third moment of *Dasein*, §95); (3) attraction (third moment of being-for-self, §98). Explain, first, why one might expect a correlation between those three and the three moments of pure quantity: continuous quantity, discrete quantity, unity (all described in §100, p. 160). Then show, using Hegel’s definitions of quality and quantity (again, see §85Z, p. 136) and his description of the various moment involved, how the correlation works out in detail. How is continuous quantity an application of becoming, discrete quantity an application of the true infinite, and unity an application of attraction (roughly: the attraction of the many to the one), and what is the difference in each case — what is added here the *indifference* of quantitative determination to the determined?
4. (Measure) In second short writing assignment, I asked about the sense in which Hegel might agree with Protagoras that “the human being is the measure of all things.” Now consider interpreting this statement as follows: there are no qualitative differences between things as they really are (what really exists is just qualityless atoms); every quality (for example: sensible qualities such as white and hot) is only the result of the way someone perceives the atoms hitting her sense organs. (This, or something like this, is the interpretation of Protagoras which Socrates advances in the *Theaetetus*.) Explain, first, why Hegel might say that *measure* is the exact right determination to use in expressing this thought. Second, explain why he might think it was *better* to say (as he does in §107Z, p. 170) that *God* is the measure of all things. Third, explain how the judgment of the concept (§§178–9) corresponds to measure, and use that correlation to show why, according to Hegel, Protagoras’s position about qualities entails, or goes along with, both moral relativism and relativism about truth in general.
5. (Essence as Ground of Existence) In the Remark to §125 (p. 195), Hegel discusses the difference between “thing” (*Ding*), a determination of essence,

and “something” (*Etwas*), a determination of being (introduced in §90). How is the difference between being and essence supposed to explain the difference between having a property, on the one hand (thing as the unity of ground and existence), vs. being determined by a quality (something as the unity of determination and quality), on the other? Explain, then, based also on the difference between mere transition (passing-over), on the one hand, and “shining,” on the other, why the determination following “something” is “limit” (§92), whereas the determination following “thing” is “appearance.” In what sense is appearance to the thing as limit is to something?

6. (Appearance) Based on the discussion of the essential relationship (*Verhältnis*) of whole and part (§135), explain in what sense Hegel can say the following about his system. First, it is not wrong to see the system as a whole which consists of (*besteht aus*) parts. Second, on the other hand, this division into parts (*Teile*) yields the mere form of the system, which in a way is the precise opposite (*Gegenteil*) of a true understanding of its content. In fact, if we stop with this, we have the mere appearance of a system, and this is also why (see §131Z) it is impossible to understand, from this point of view, how one can call a halt (*Halt*) to the further addition of new parts. Finally, this way of looking at the system is one which portrays it as *dead*; what is missing is precisely the determination of *life*.
7. (Actuality) Consider the following three accounts of the relationship between God, the world as possibility, and the world as actuality. (1) “Before” God created the world, it had no *real* possibility at all: it was “merely,” formally possible (§143), and, in creating the world, God added nothing at all to this mere possibility, other than the relationship to his actualizing will, nor was there anything in the content of the world which made that will necessary: the world is created by grace, and is purely contingent (§144). (2) The possibility of the world is the divine essence; God’s “creation” of the world doesn’t take him out of himself, or even express something about him which was merely implicit: God and the world are the same thing, considered as substance (= *natura naturans*) and as modes or accidents (*natura naturata*). (3) God is the cause of the world: the two are distinct, but, given the divine nature, the world necessarily follows. Explain in what sense Hegel can say that all three of these seemingly mutually inconsistent alternatives is correct, but that all regard the world as mere actuality, not as independent object (*Objekt*), or (which it to say the same thing) leave out the moment of divine *purpose*.

(should be three more questions, maybe next time :())