Questions

(Introduction to the Dialectic/Concepts of Pure Reason) Consider a hypothetical syllogism of the form:

If all C is D, then all A is B.
But, all C is D.
Therefore, all A is B.

Explain the diﬀerence between (1) the unity of the understanding which allows the concept A to be brought under the concept B and (2) the unity of reason which allows the judgment All A is B to be explained by the principle, If all C is D, then all A is B. In particular: explain how both (1) and (2) involve the uniﬁcation of the same manifold of possible cognitions, namely, those falling under the concept A. The purpose of the uniﬁcation (1) is to “collect much possible knowledge into one” — that is, in this case, to allow the predicate concept, B, to be applied at once to every object of the subject concept, A. So the possible objects of A are to be united in virtue of their common conformity to the concept A, and for the purpose of representing them all together as object to B. In virtue of what, and for what purpose, are the objects of A to be united in (2)?

(Concepts of Pure Reason) In the Transcendental Analytic, it is argued that the manifold in intuition must be such as to allow the understanding to think it under concepts, i.e. that there is an object of experience. Why would it be wrong to argue, further, that manifold in sense must be such as to allow reason to think the object of experience under principles? If, nevertheless, we make such a demand, why does this result in an attempt to think something further through the categories, which are pure concepts of the understanding? (Hint for both parts: thinking an object is an act of what faculty?) Finally, why does this new alleged use of the categories involve applying them transcendently, that is, using them to think an object which could never be the object of experience? (Hint: why is any judgment about the object of experience always conditioned?)

(Paralogisms) Consider the syllogism on p. 371 (B410–11). Kant says that it involves a sophisma ﬁgurae dictionis: that is, a fallacy of equivocation. Give another example of a syllogism which displays this fallacy. Where is the equivocation in your example? What phrase, then, in Kant’s example, must contain the term that is being used equivocally? (You should be able to identify the phrase where the equivocation must be just on the basis of the form of the syllogism.) Show, further, based on Kant’s text, that the speciﬁc word used equivocally is “thought.”

(Antinomies) According to the Thesis of the Third Antinomy, p. 409 (A444/B472), “it is necessary to assume that there is,” in addition to natural causality, “also another causality, that of freedom.” Explain how “freedom” is deﬁned here, and explain why, according to Kant, reason (in its argument for the Thesis) demands the existence of a “free” cause (in that sense of “free”). On the other hand, how can we tell, based on the conclusions of the Transcendental Analytic (in particular, the Second Analogy), that this demand could never be fulﬁlled by any object of experience, i.e. that we can never experience anything which is in that sense “free”? (Note: of course the argument for the Thesis of the Third Antinomy contains a mistake, according to Kant, since the Antinomy as a whole, both Thesis and Antithesis, is a product of transcendental illusion, as are all the Antinomies. So your explanation of “why reason demands” this will incorporate the mistaken step or steps. The inconsistency of the conclusion with the Second Analogy will then show why Kant must think there is a mistake somewhere.)

(Solution to the Third Antinomy) Freedom (more precisely: transcendental freedom) would seem to be inconsistent with determinism, for the following reason. Suppose I freely choose how to act at time t. If we deﬁne “determinism” as the view that the future is completely determined by the past, then, according to determinism, whatever happens after t must be completely determined by what happened long before t (i.e., only one course of future events can be compatible with that course of past events). Therefore, I can only choose one way, i.e. can’t choose freely. What would Kant say about this argument? (Note that this is a contemporary argument which Kant does not address directly. You can’t answer this question by just summarizing the Solution to the Third Antinomy; you will need to think about how Kant would respond to a question that no one actually puts to him.) (Hint: if I am free, is my free choice something that happens at a time? Does Kant’s deﬁnition of “freedom” imply that there is more than one way I can choose? Is there more than one way I can choose, according to Kant? What is my “intelligible character”?)

(Ideal) What is (supposed to be) the concept of an ens realissimum? Explain why, if we really could think something through this concept, it would be an “ideal,” as Kant deﬁnes that term on p. 485 (A568/B596): explain, that is, why it would be the concept of an individual object. How, according to Kant, is this supposed concept related to another supposed concept, the concept of the totality of all possible things? In particular: why does reason’s (mistaken) demand, that a thing be known as possible by seeing it as one among all the possible things, i.e. by comparing it to the sum of all possibilities, end up being a demand that everything be thought by comparison to the ideal of the ens realissimum? How does the argument depend on the principle (also mistaken, according to Kant) that realities cannot oppose each other, i.e. that the only thing opposed to reality is negation?

(Impossibility of the Proofs) Suppose we have an ordinary empirical concept, C, and we already agree that C represents some possible objects. Call these possible object of C the (possible) C-things. Suppose now (1) I go on to tell you that some (possible) C-things are heavy. This involves adding further information about what is possible: not only is a C-thing possible, but a heavy C-thing is possible. Suppose, on the other hand, (2) I go on to tell you that some C-things are actual (i.e., that there actually are some C-things, that the concept C represents some actual object). How, according to Kant, is (2) diﬀerent from (1)? Since we are assuming C is an empirical concept, what am I adding to the claim that C-things are possible when I say that at least some are actual? Explain using the example of the 100 thalers (dollars). (Hint: how must an actual C-thing be related to me? What is the role of sensation here?) How does this show, in advance, that there will have to be a problem with any proof in which we ﬁrst show that God possibly exists, and then go on, through some further steps, to show that God actually exists?