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1.
- (Introduction to the Dialectic/Concepts of Pure Reason) Consider a
hypothetical syllogism of the form:
If all C is D, then all A is B.
But, all C is D.
Therefore, all A is B.
Explain the difference between (1) the unity of the understanding which allows
the concept A to be brought under the concept B and (2) the unity of reason
which allows the judgment All A is B to be explained by the principle, If all C is
D, then all A is B. In particular: both (1) and (2) involve the unification of the
same manifold of possible cognitions: which ones? The purpose of the
unification (1) is to “collect much possible knowledge into one” — that
is, in this case, to allow the predicate concept, B, to be applied at once
to every object of the subject concept, A. So the possible objects of A
are to be united by virtue of their common conformity to the concept
A. In virtue of what, and for what purpose, are objects to be united in
(2)?
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2.
- (Concepts of Pure Reason) In the Transcendental Analytic, it is argued
that the object of experience must be such as to allow the understanding
to think it under concepts. Why would it wrong to argue, further, that
the object of experience must be such as to allow reason to think the
object of experience under principles? If, nevertheless, we make such a
demand, why does this result in an attempt to think something further
through the categories, which are pure concepts of the understanding? (Hint
for both parts: what faculty thinks an object?) Finally, why does this
new alleged use of the categories involve applying them transcendently,
that is, using them to think an object which could never be the object of
experience? (Hint: why is any judgment about the object of experience always
conditioned?)
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3.
- (Paralogisms) Consider the syllogism on p. 371 (B410–11). Kant says that it
involves a sophisma figurae dictionis: that is, a fallacy of equivocation. Give
another example of a syllogism which displays this fallacy. Where is the
equivocation in your example? What phrase, then, in Kant’s example, must
contain the term that is being used equivocally? (You should be able to identify
the phrase where the equivocation must be just on the basis of the form of the
syllogism.) Why, based on Kant’s text, might you think that the specific term
used equivocally is “thought”? If you can, make a case that the term used
equivocally is actually “subject.”
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4.
- (Antinomies) According to the Thesis of the Third Antinomy, p. 409
(A444/B472), “it is necessary to assume that there is,” in addition to natural
causality, “also another causality, that of freedom.” Explain how “freedom” is
defined here, and explain why, according to Kant, reason (in its argument for the
Thesis) demands the existence of a “free” cause (in that sense of free). On the
other hand, how can we tell, based on the conclusions of the Transcendental
Analytic (in particular, the Second Analogy), that this demand could never be
fulfilled by any object of experience, i.e. that we can never experience anything
which is in that sense “free”? (Note: of course the argument for the Thesis of the
Third Antinomy contains a mistake, according to Kant, since the Antinomy as a
whole, both Thesis and Antithesis, is a product of transcendental illusion, as are
all the Antinomies. So your explanation of “why reason demands” this will
incorporate the mistaken step or steps. The inconsistency of the conclusion with
the Second Analogy will then show why Kant must think there is a mistake
somewhere.)
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5.
- (Solution to the Third Antinomy) Freedom (more precisely: transcendental
freedom) would seem to be inconsistent with determinism, for the following
reason. Suppose I freely choose how to act at time t. According to determinism,
whatever happens after t must be completely determined by what happened long
before t (i.e., only one course of future events can be compatible with that course
of past events). Therefore, I can only choose one way, i.e. can’t choose freely.
What would Kant say about this argument? (Note that this is a contemporary
argument which Kant does not address directly. You can’t answer this question by
just summarizing the Solution to the Third Antinomy; you will need to think
about how Kant would respond to a question that no one actually puts to
him.) (Hint: if I am free, is my free choice something that happens at a
time? Is there more than one way I can choose? What is my “intelligible
character”?)
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6.
- (Ideal) What is (supposed to be) the concept of an ens realissimum? Explain
what makes this concept an “ideal,” as Kant defines that term on p. 485
(A568/B596): explain, that is, why this is the concept of an individual
object. How, according to Kant, is this concept related to the totality
of all possible things? In particular: why does reason’s demand, that a
thing be known as possible by seeing it as one among all the possible
things, i.e. by comparing it to the sum of all possibilities, end up being a
demand that everything be thought by comparison to the ideal of the ens
realissimum? How does the argument depend on the principle that realities
cannot oppose each other, i.e. that the only thing opposed to reality is
negation?
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7.
- (Impossibility of the Proofs) Suppose we have a concept, C, and we already
agree that C’s are possible. Suppose (1) I go on to tell you that some
C’s are heavy. This involves adding further information about what is
possible: not only is a C possible, but a heavy C is possible. Suppose, on the
other hand, (2) I go on to tell you that some C’s are actual (i.e., that
there actually are some C’s). How, according to Kant, is (2) different
from (1)? Assuming C is an empirical concept, what am I adding to the
claim that C’s are possible when I say that at least some are actual?
Explain using the example of the 100 thalers (dollars). How is this related to
what Kant says about the modality of judgments at the bottom of p. 109
(A74/B99–100) and about the categories of modality, at the beginning of
the “Explanation” of the Postulates of Empirical Thought, on p. 239
(A219/B266)?
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8.
- (Canon) Explain the difference between a pragmatic law and a moral law,
according to Kant. How is each related to happiness? (Explain what “happiness”
means, according to Kant.) Explain further why, given these definition (of moral
law and of happiness), and given that the “supreme good” (or “supreme
derivative good”) is as Kant describes on pp. 640–41 (A813–14/B841–2), our only
hope for the supreme good would be to assume that God exists. What
is the definition of “God,” as the term is used in the conclusion of this
argument?