

Phil 190: Second Response/Analysis Paper, Group II
Fall, 2015

Instructions

Note: this assignment is for students in Group II *only*.

The assignment is due, as an attachment, via the “Assignments” tool on eCommons, by midnight Thursday, November 12 (in PDF or any format easily converted to PDF, e.g. MSWord, L^AT_EX, RTF, plain text).

Please respond to the following question in approximately two pages (double spaced). (Needless to say this should be your own original work.)

In *Ideas* §32, Husserl makes a connection between “attempted doubt” and the peculiar modification or change in attitude which he calls *ἐποχή* (*epochē*). On the other hand, he says that *ἐποχή* is not exactly the same thing as Descartes’s attempted doubt, because “in the attempt to doubt . . . the ‘excluding’ is brought about in and with a modification of counter positing, namely the ‘supposition’ of non-being” (p. 59). In other words, Descartes’s attempt to doubt, unlike Husserl’s *ἐποχή*, involves *supposing that our original positing was wrong*. How, according to Husserl, is the proposed phenomenological *ἐποχή* therefore related to (similar to and different from) Descartes’s universal attempted doubt (in procedure, scope, and aim)?