

**Phil 190: Second Response/Analysis Paper, Group IV**  
Fall, 2015

**Instructions**

**Note:** this assignment is for students in Group IV *only*.

The assignment is due, as an attachment, via the “Assignments” tool on eCommons, by midnight Tuesday, December 1 (in PDF or any format easily converted to PDF, e.g. MSWord, L<sup>A</sup>T<sub>E</sub>X, RTF, plain text).

Please respond to the following question in approximately two pages (double spaced). (Needless to say this should be your own original work.)

In §49 of the *Ideas* (p. 110), Husserl says that “the world of transcendent ‘res’ [i.e., the world of physical things (*Dinge*) and what is founded on them, the “real” world] is entirely referred to consciousness and, more particularly, not to some logically conceived consciousness but to actual consciousness.” But surely there are many things in the world of which no one is actually conscious, although someone, at least logically speaking, *might* be conscious of them. Using the preceding discussion (especially §48 and the later parts of §47), explain why this is not a problem for Husserl. That is: explain what “referred to . . . actual consciousness” means, such that something can be “referred to actual consciousness” even though nobody is actually conscious of it.